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Introduction
Trade associations (TAs) are formal, multimember organiza-
tions that represent business interests in a specific context 
(Aldrich & Staber, 1988; Rajwani, Lawton, & Phillips, 2015). 
As industry entrepreneurs, agents of collective identity, and 
political and social actors, TAs are an important feature of the 
business and social landscape that are underresearched in 
studies of management and organization. They can define the 
boundaries of their members’ shared interests broadly or nar-
rowly. For example, some TAs align with the boundaries of an 
industry, such as the National Association of Realtors. Other 
TAs represent a subsector of an industry, such as the Regional 
Airline Association. TAs may serve small regions, such as a 
city or substate, or may have geographically dispersed mem-
bership, bounded nationally or even internationally. The 
British and U.S. Chambers of Commerce, which represent the 
interests of businesses of any size, region, or sector, are exam-
ples of highly generalist TAs.
Membership in TAs is voluntary and members contribute 
dues and fees to underwrite the costs of association. Because 
TAs rely on members for the resources that enable them to 
act, they exist in an ongoing tension between growing mem-
bership to increase available resources, and keeping member-
ship narrow enough to allow coordination among diverse 
interests (Staber & Aldrich, 1983). Research on the ecology 
of TA populations reveals that associations form easily to 
address shared problems and grow quickly, especially when 
the interests they serve are broad. Once formed, TAs are fairly 
enduring, and become the forum through which firms identify 
and solve new problems (Barnett, 2006). Over time, however, 
TAs with broadly defined interests may be replaced by, or 
transform into, TAs that define their boundaries around a nar-
rower shared interest, reflecting the difficulty of coordinating 
collaboration among dispersed interests (Aldrich, Staber, 
Beggs, & Zimmer, 1990; Barnett, Mischke, & Ocasio, 2000). 
Despite what would seem to be an environment in which 
associations strategically compete for members, this body of 
research suggests that associations have norms discouraging 
overt competition over members and interest domains 
(Aldrich et al., 1990).
Prior research suggests several reasons that firms may 
join TAs. A primary reason is to reduce uncertainty in their 
shared environment and to gain perspective on shared prob-
lems. By joining associations, firms can share information 
about sociopolitical issues (Barnett, 2013; Kirby, 1988) and 
gain access to particular services and resources that tran-
scend organizational boundaries (May, McHugh, & Taylor, 
1998). Participating in a TA provides firms access to knowl-
edge and expertise (Lawton, Rajwani, & Doh 2013) that may 
help them develop individual and firm-level capabilities 
(Kahl, 2014; Minto, 2016). Consequently, these associations 
may also provide a form of shelter for interorganizational 
coordination by facilitating the sharing of nonmarket infor-
mation and resources without triggering antitrust concerns 
(Rajwani et al., 2015; Vives, 1990). Scholars also note that 
firms choose membership in TAs through a social matching 
process during which firms search until they find a TA with 
which they have sufficient strategic fit (Barnett et al., 2000). 
But do the positives outweigh the negatives? TAs may often 
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exert either too much or too little influence on the public 
policy-making process, resulting in a disconnect with the 
needs and expectations of member firms.
Role and Function
As member-driven organizations, TAs function follows from 
the reasons members participate. TAs seek to improve the 
conditions of members’ business environment by pursuing 
policy initiatives and managing issues of reputation and 
legitimacy. From a sociological perspective, TAs provide an 
arena for social construction of meaning and to allow mem-
bers to build a shared perspective on their market activities. 
Despite their members’ presumed shared interest, research 
finds that TA activity is driven primarily by the interests of 
the largest firms in an industry, suggesting that the social 
environment TAs create may be conducive to social coer-
cion, allowing large, influential firms to push their own 
agendas on the collective (Barnett, 2013).
In seeking to shape public policy in their members’ inter-
est, TAs create influence (Schaefer & Kerrigan, 2008) and 
reputational trust with political actors (Tucker, 2008). TAs 
develop strong political resources and specialized political 
capabilities to generate access to policy makers and allow 
them to engage in lobbying and other forms of political activ-
ity (Minto, 2016). Research suggests that key industry fac-
tors such as competition, concentration, size, and government 
procurement influence TAs attempts to lobby government 
and improve industry conditions (Drope & Hansen, 2009; 
Reveley & Ville, 2010). They also generate influence within 
their industry by facilitating the sharing of standards and 
governance structures and by educating members on regula-
tory requirements and opportunities (Lawton, Doh, & 
Rajwani, 2014). Both within and outside membership, TAs 
help manage members’ reputational interdependence to pro-
tect and enhance the reputation of members and the legiti-
macy of their business activities (Barnett & Hoffman, 2008; 
Tucker, 2008).
In addition to building influence to impact policy, TAs 
help construct shared understanding of the purpose and func-
tion of the area of business they represent. By constructing 
shared meaning, TAs influence how firms understand their 
market activities, shaping their strategies and even the nature 
of market competition. By specializing in narrow interest 
domains, TAs generate categories and divide a broad group 
of firms (an industry) into separate special interest organiza-
tions, and help members reduce uncertainty by focusing the 
lens through which members identify the scope of their 
shared environment. TAs thus reconstruct, adapt, or rein-
force the nature of the collective interest, defining what 
interests are shared and the meaning behind shared prob-
lems. As part of this process of cultural production, TAs cre-
ate norms, standards, and collective identity (Spillman, 
2012). Therefore, this collective process by which TAs 
construct shared meaning and shared problems are important 
areas for researchers to explore.
We argue that scholars have a timely and important oppor-
tunity to contribute knowledge on how collective action 
through TAs impacts business and society more broadly. 
Researcher should explore how the functions of TAs as iden-
tified above influence the behavior of members and the 
nature of the public policy arena. Scholars should also 
attempt to uncover how associations’ interest domains influ-
ence the scope and targets of their actions. Finally, scholars 
should look at how TAs exert both positive and negative 
influence on society more broadly, through their influence on 
public policy, industry structure, and the nature of 
competition.
A 360-Degree Approach to TAs
To generate a robust understanding of TAs, researchers can 
approach the collective phenomena from various levels of 
analysis. In particular, we suggest researchers should study 
TAs from the member-firm level of analysis, from the level 
of the TA itself as an organization, and at the collective level 
composed of both members and the TA organization. 
Research at the firm level can explore whether and how firms 
attempt to shape the shared interest of the TA in their favor, 
how firms’ operational and strategic behaviors are influenced 
by TAs, and how firms generate private benefit through col-
lective resource deployment in TAs. At the TA organizational 
level, researchers should build theory on TAs as strategic 
organizations in their own right, study TAs from the perspec-
tive of organizational design, and further explore the extent 
to which norms of noncompetition shape and constrain TA 
functions. Finally, at the collective levels, researchers should 
continue to study how TAs help construct meaning and 
define shared issues and interests.
Emerging Theories for TA Research
In the following section, we suggest three theoretical 
approaches for scholars interested in undertaking research 
into or involving TAs. These approaches include taking a 
strategic view of organizational design, exploring cultural 
sociology, and applying various resource-focused theories of 
management and organization. We provide a brief summary 
of the questions each theory addresses and identify important 
constructs. We highlight examples of work in each domain 
that has direct application to TA research and offer sugges-
tions on ways the theory might be particularly useful for 
building our understanding of TAs.
Organizational Design
TAs are meta-organizations made up of multiple individuals 
and organizations working toward a shared purpose. Gulati, 
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Puranam, and Tushman (2012) highlighted the growing 
importance of meta-organizational designs as a means of 
coordinating production beyond the boundaries of the indi-
vidual firm. They define meta-organizations as “networks of 
firms or individuals not bound by authority based on employ-
ment relationships, but characterized by a system-level goal” 
(Gulati et al., 2012). Adopting this model can give fresh per-
spective on TAs, encouraging us to view TAs as productive 
entities and their members as agents and suppliers rather than 
the other way around.
Gulati et al.’s meta-organizational design perspective 
emphasizes the degree of openness in the collective and deci-
sion-making stratification in determining the design of organi-
zation through meta-organizational forms. TA researchers can 
draw on research on generalist and specialist approaches as a 
starting point and should build theory to explain variation in 
TA governance systems and collective identity as a mecha-
nism for organizing outside a firm. The theoretical perspective 
also points out the need to study whether governance mecha-
nisms such as roles, ownership, or decision-making stratifica-
tion affect the types of functions TAs pursue.
Culture and Interest
Scholars of organizational culture have sounded the call to 
further understand the social conditions under which inter-
est-oriented action is generated (Spillman & Strand, 2013) 
and how culture is shared and interpreted across organiza-
tional boundaries (Weber & Dacin, 2011). We suggest that 
TA scholars are especially well situated to pursue this 
research. TAs act as loci of interactions between firms, pro-
viding an arena for interest and meaning to be constructed 
and serving as the primary mechanism through which busi-
ness firms pursue action in their collective interests.
A particularly promising theoretical perspective is on TAs 
as a site of cultural production in which member organiza-
tions make meaning of their market pursuits (Spillman, 
2012). Greater understanding of the process of meaning 
making may offer important insight into how firms organize 
around niche interests and how generalist associations recon-
struct meaning to become specialist associations. In addition 
to exploring how meaning is made within a TA, scholars 
might consider whether TAs as organizations themselves act 
as curators of meaning (Mitnick & Ryan, 2015), and the 
extent to which such actions may constitute strategic agency.
Resource-Based Approaches
Resource mobilization theory and the resource-based view 
(RBV) of the firm, as well as related theory on capabilities, 
offer complementary approaches to studies of TAs. There is 
limited research on resource and capabilities perspectives on 
TAs and other forms of meta-organization (Gulati et al., 
2012).
The central logic of the RBV is that firms have differen-
tial abilities to access, control, and organize productive 
resources and that these differences can explain heteroge-
neity of firm strategies, structures, and performance 
(Leiblein, 2011). The capabilities perspective emphasizes 
firms’ abilities to perform functions that contribute to a 
specific organizational purpose using different resource 
combinations (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997). A capabilities perspective can help explain 
how firms use externally located resources to enhance 
their own productive efforts. In doing so, scholars could 
unpack whether and how firms can extract proprietary ben-
efit from TA resources and capacities to which all members 
have access. A promising approach to this may be in under-
standing how firms can incorporate external resources 
through asset orchestration and co-specialization (Teece, 
2007). Another promising approach is exploring TAs as an 
external source through which firms engage in learning 
routines and build proprietary capabilities (Kahl, 2014; 
Minto, 2016). Although dynamic capabilities cannot be 
purchased (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003), scholars could explore 
whether and how a TA’s core functions of scanning and 
altering its members’ environment can substitute or com-
plement firms’ higher order capabilities.
RBV and capability-based theories primarily seek to 
explain the creation and maintenance of competitive 
advantage, which makes their application to TAs problem-
atic. Because associations are implicitly noncompetitive at 
the population level (Staber & Aldrich, 1983), applying the 
assumptions that underlie resource-based theories to the 
study of TAs can be challenging, and assessing the effec-
tiveness of capabilities approaches is difficult. This is 
because the value generation of TAs can be subjective and 
implicit and the observable elements such as policy out-
comes may be common across different sectors and asso-
ciations. The resource mobilization theory of social 
movements balances this approach and offers a comple-
mentary theoretical lens through which to focus on TAs. 
The social movement theory of resource mobilization 
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977) looks at how social movement 
organizations exert coordination and strategic effort to 
aggregate, produce, and appropriate resources and convert 
them into collective resources that support collective 
action pursued outside institutional and organizational 
channels (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). Although unlike 
most social movements, TAs as interest groups (Snow, 
Soule, & Kriesi, 2008) normally act within institutional 
channels. Scholars using this approach can build on exist-
ing research that suggests TAs allow firms to create socio-
political legitimacy to exploit political opportunities 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994), actively manage organizational 
legitimacy (Elsbach, 1994), and help manage reputational 
risks (King & Lenox, 2000).
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Final Thoughts
In this article, we highlight features of collective action 
through TAs that we believe offer exciting potential for fur-
ther research. We point out that TAs are complex and diverse 
organizations, and we encourage scholars to consider multi-
ple approaches to and theoretical lenses on TA research. We 
identify one particular paradox—that although we assume 
TAs act in members shared interests, TA actions can reflect 
the interests of the association’s largest firms—to encourage 
scholars to take another look at, and challenge implicit 
assumption about, collective action through TAs. In doing 
so, we set up the following dialog on TA research to encour-
age more research on the function and meaning of TAs to 
help management and organization scholars gain insight into 
how TAs influence member firms market and nonmarket 
strategies and exert wider societal impact.
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